THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:
Can It Do It All?

A Monograph
By
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Infantry

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THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS: CAN IT DO IT ALL? by MAJ Wayne W. Grigsby Jr, USA, 57 pages.

This monograph discusses whether or not an Army Division can dual function as both a Joint Task Force (JTF) and an Army Forces Command (ARFOR). The current reduction of forces within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the lack of an identifiable enemy has forced the United States to pursue strategic objectives in a more joint manner. This has caused the increased use of JTFs. Most recently, the 10th Mountain Division performed the mission as a JTF during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

The monograph first examines the current force structure of a division staff, comparing and contrasting the functions of both the division staff and the JTF staff. Next, the monograph examines purpose, organization, and capabilities of a JTF. It then looks at the peculiarities of peace operations. Finally, the author analyzes Operation Uphold Democracy, reviewing the shortfalls a division has when it functions as a JTF and determining whether these shortfalls can be overcome.

This monograph concludes that a division headquarters is suitable to dual function as a JTF and ARFOR headquarters when it receives significant augmentation from a corps headquarters or combatant command.

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
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Title of Monograph: The Division Headquarters: Can It Do It All?

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INTRODUCTION

The means used by the United States in addressing problems worldwide has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The Department of Defense has used Joint Task Forces (JTFs) more frequently since 1989. Three major reasons for this change are: 1) an inability to identify future threats, 2) the manner in which the United States arrays its forces throughout the world, and 3) the reduction in American military strength.

The United States must change the way it focuses on military preparation because of the lack of an identifiable enemy. Not knowing who the enemy is forces the United States to change from a threat-based force to a capability-based force. This requires increased flexibility when deploying forces throughout the world. During the Cold War, focusing on a unit's general defense plan (GDP) or fighting the Krasnovians at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) was a method an U.S. Army division used to prepare itself for war. Now a division must have the capability and flexibility to focus on different contingency operations against a myriad of threats.[1]

Another significant change is the way the United

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States Army deploys its forces throughout the world. Most recently, the U.S. Army has transitioned from a forward-based Army to a force projection Army.[2] The Army was more robust in its force structure and had more forces deployed throughout the world during the Cold War. There were more forces deployed overseas in Central Europe because of the Soviet threat. The U.S. Army used this forward-based force in order to counter the threat of the Russians or another known threat.

The Army has changed to a force projection strategy because the Cold War has ended and resources have decreased.[3] The Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy are reducing in strength as well. The Department of Defense now has its preponderance of military forces CONUS-based in light of these changes. These forces have the capability to project combat power quickly throughout the world.

The combination of not knowing the threat, having a force projection military, and the drawdown of forces calls for a more flexible capability which has the combat power and resources to deter or defeat any adversary. Most recently, General Reimer, the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that "as the force becomes smaller, the utilization of joint forces will increase. Jointness is the best use of the dollar."[4] This is one reason why the use of JTFs has

increased since the end of the Cold War and they will continue to be used in the future.

In October 1994, during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, the 18th Airborne Corps tasked the 10th Mountain Division to command a JTF headquarters.[5] This same division was tasked to be an ARFOR headquarters in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993.[6] The 1995 Field Manual (FM) 71-100, Division Operations, states that "a division headquarters normally will not be asked to perform a mission as a JTF."[7] This seems ironic since the most current FM 71-100 is dated after the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy in which the 10th Mountain division headquarters was the JTF. COL Dubik (Commander, 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy) stated that "a division can not perform a mission as both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters."[8] COL Merrit, III Corps G-1, basically had the same response to the question regarding whether a division can function as both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters.[9] Both concluded that a division could not make the mental leap from the tactical level of war to the operational level of war. They also felt it would take too much augmentation to make a division a JTF.

The increased use of JTFs and the most recent use of a division as a JTF, combined with the lack of doctrine to

support the mission, creates a problem for the Army. The purpose of this monograph is to begin to make a determination as to whether a division can simultaneously function as both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters effectively. This monograph can also be used as a starting point for a division planner when his or her division is tasked to act as a JTF/ARFOR headquarters. It will also provide insights for units which are part of a division JTF/ARFOR headquarters. The primary research question for this monograph is: Can an Army division staff function as both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters during peacekeeping operations?

The methodology used in the monograph is straight-forward. The monograph will initially provide information on the organization, purpose, and capabilities of division, JTF, and ARFOR headquarters. Thereafter the author will determine the shortcomings of a division tasked to be both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters. The monograph will provide information on peacekeeping operations, focusing on the peculiarities and differences between peacekeeping operations and actual combat. The peculiarities may add other complications when a division is asked to be a JTF/ARFOR headquarters. The author will then analyze a case study: Operation Uphold Democracy. This case study will provide information that identifies the shortcomings a

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division force structure presents to a unit simultaneously acting as a JTF and ARFOR headquarters. Finally, the author will address several courses of action that may enable a division headquarters to function in its normal capacity while also functioning as a JTF and ARFOR headquarters.

DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE

In order to fully understand the purpose, organization, and capabilities of the U.S. Army division, we must look to the past and research the reasons why the Department of Defense created this particular force structure. The Army developed the force structure of today's division in the early 1960s following the Pentomic Era.[10] The modern division is very similar to the division of the 1960s except that additional companies were added to heavy divisions in the early 1980s.[11]

After World War II and throughout the Korean War, the Army division did not change much at all. The focus of the Army prior to the Korean War was on fighting the Soviet enemy in Central Europe.[12] After the Korean War, the focus of the Army was on how to fight on an atomic battlefield.[13] The Army felt its divisional force structure was still

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correct and if it did not work the atomic bomb could make up for any shortcomings.

During the Korean War, the Army conducted studies on the capabilities of atomic weapons in a tactical role. Colonel G. C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner wrote a book entitled Atomic Weapons in Land Combat.[14] The authors stated that "atomic weapons, tactically employed, should be incorporated into our first line of defense against any creeping aggression."[15] General Maxwell D. Taylor and Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke completed studies in 1954 that looked at changing the divisional force structure. The threat of atomic weapons on the battlefield caused Army leaders to look for a division that enabled the Army to fight in a more dispersed manner. This new Army division needed more dispersion to prevent atomic weapons from totally destroying the unit during combat or preparation for hostilities.[16]

The Army transitioned to the Pentomic Division in 1956, an organization which provided more dispersion of units on the atomic battlefield. The Department of the Army stated: "It is felt that this new division structure will raise the combat effectiveness of the Army by exploiting maximum modern technology for the improvement of firepower, mobility, and control."[17]

By 1959 the need for a new division force structure was apparent. The change in U.S. nuclear policy from mass retaliation to flexible response combined with the decreased capability to command and control a division in a conventional war caused expectations regarding the Pentomic Division to diminish. In January 1959, General Bruce C. Clark ordered a study called the Modern Mobile Army 1965-1970 (MOMAR I). The MOMAR I study concluded "that the Army had to be capable of conducting combat operations throughout the world in either a nuclear or non-nuclear environment and against a variety of enemy forces."[18] In 1960, the Department of the Army tasked the Command and General Staff College to conduct a study of the capabilities of MOMAR I. The resulting report strongly recommended that the new division structure provide the capability to fight in a "limited war with nuclear weapons or a general war without nuclear weapons."[19] The study also recommended that the new divisions take a building block approach using the battalion as the fundamental element. In other words, a division should have the capability to accept and command a mix of mechanized infantry, armor, or airborne battalions.

The Department of the Army concluded that the MOMAR I was not the complete answer to what was needed. This proposed force structure had only two division types in the

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original concept, a heavy division and a medium division. This Army force structure did not have the flexibility needed to face different threats because of its dependance upon heavy units and the limited number of divisions specified by MOMAR 1.[20] Instead, the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) 1965 was introduced and approved by the Department of the Army in 1961. The essence of the ROAD came from MOMAR I. This new unit had a common division base to which different type battalions could be added dependant upon the mission demands or requirements.[21] The structure also included artillery support, aviation support, and, for the first time, organic logistics support.[22] A positive aspect of the ROAD was its greater flexibility in meeting future threats than was the case with its Pentomic predecessor.

The current divisional design is shown in Figure 1. This design is very similar to that developed with the ROAD (Figure 2). The differences are:

(1) today's structure has an aviation and engineer brigade whereas the ROAD had only battalions of each type,

(2) today's division has a MI battalion and a chemical company whereas the ROAD did not have these type units, and

(3) today's division has nine maneuver battalions whereas the ROAD had ten maneuver battalions.

Figure #1 Division Base Structure


Note 1: Infantry, mechanized infantry, or armored units, depending on task organization.
Note 2: Engineer battalion in light, airborne, air assault divisions.

Figure #2 ROAD Base Structure

COMMON DIVISION BASE

The headquarters and staff of modern divisions have the capability to command and control all organic, attached, and supporting U.S. Army units.[23] Most missions fall within the tactical level of war. Sometimes a division will conduct activities at the operational level of war.[24] It will generate combat power by synchronizing the effects of the battlefield operating systems.[25] These battlefield operating systems provide a division framework for planning and mission execution.

In summary, today's division is very similar to the ROAD developed in the early 1960s. The ROAD was designed to have the flexibility necessary to counter the wide variety of threats the Army might confront. Today's structure still needs to ensure that same flexibility, but the Army is not just adding Army battalions to the division. The Army may now be adding a marine battalion, an air force wing, or a naval element. Creators of the ROAD did not envision subordinating other service elements to an Army division headquarters. The division also normally conducts operations at the tactical level of war. Tasking a division to become a JTF would likely encompass requirements at the operational level of war. The operational operating systems (OOS) are somewhat different from tactically-oriented battlefield operating systems (BOS).[26] A division may not

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have the capability to fight using the operational operating
systems.

THE JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)

The drawdown of resources within the Department of
Defense has increased the use of JTFs for contingency
missions. The following section will provide information on
the purpose, organization, and capabilities of a JTF. It
will also compare and contrast certain aspects of a JTF with
a division organization. A JTFs primary purpose is to
execute a myriad of contingency missions that the Department
of Defense or a CINC may assign.[27] A JTF may be the most
beneficial option for executing evolving contingency
missions, but is not the only option. It is an ad hoc
organization that is inherently flexible enough to command
and control a myriad of different units.

Normally, a CINC will create a JTF to accomplish a
contingency mission within his AOR.[28] Joint Publication 5-
00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures states: "The
Secretary of Defense, a CINC, or a commander of a
subordinate unified command, or an existing JTF may

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establish JTFs."[29] Joint Publication 5-00.2 states:

> A JTF is established when the mission has
> a specific limited objective and does not require
> overall centralized control of logistics. The
> mission assigned to a JTF should require execution
> of responsibilities, involving two or more services
> on a significant scale and close integration of
> effort, or should require coordination within a
> subordinate area or coordination of local defense
> of a subordinate area. A JTF is dissolved when the
> purpose for which it was create has been achieved[30]

This definition is very similar to the definition in FM 100-5.[31]

The key characteristic of a JTF is that it is an ad hoc organization.[32] Its organization is threat-dependant: the components of a JTF are task organized to counter a specific threat. Figure 3 displays a typical organizational structure of a JTF.[33] Commanders may add to the organization or delete from the structure as the mission dictates.[34] A commander of a JTF (CJTF) will usually exercise operational control (OPCON) over assigned and attached units. FM 100-5 states:

> This command relationship provides full
> authority to organize commands and forces and
> employ them as the commander considers necessary
> to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON will not
> normally include authority to include logistics.[35]

When comparing the JTF staff structure to the division staff structure there are both similarities and differences.

The J-1 and the G-1 have similar tasks except for one major area. When a service component is part of a JTF

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Figure #3 JTF Staff Structure

CJTF
ADMIN | HQ SPT ACTY | PAO | CHAP | SURG | SJA | COMPT | DEPCJTF
ENGR | TRANS
CofS --------- LNOs

J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6

JIB   JIC   JOC   JMC   JCCC
JVB   JIF   JTCB   SAPO   JCSE
           JMEC   JRCC   JFUB
           JIPC   JMFU   JCMEB
                                 JMRO

JTF staff organization

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it will normally rely on its own service for actual personnel replacement operations.[36] The Army will not request replacements from the J-1, it will request and receive replacements from its own G-1 or its service component. The J-1 instead is responsible for developing personnel policies and procedures within the JTF and ensuring these policies are followed.[37] This point is critical, especially when a JTF is formed using an already established headquarters like a division. Usually the division commander will take the more experienced or talented personnel from the G-1 shop to form his J-1 shop. This is probably not the best solution since the more experienced personnel should stay on the G-1 staff. The Army component or G1 will conduct the majority of the manning operations for the Army in a JTF.[38]

The J-4/G-4 comparison is very similar to the above. Once again the service component will perform the majority of actual logistical support for specific services within the JTF.[39] Joint Pub 5-00.2 states: "In general, the JTF J-4 formulates and implements CJTF policies and guidance to ensure effective logistical support for all forces assigned or attached to the JTF."[40] An important part of the actual definition of a JTF says "that a JTF will not normally have centralized control over logistical operations."[41] Yet once

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again the majority of JTF commanders will task organize from the G-4 shop the most experienced workers. This will leave the component G-4 short-handed and not capable of performing the most critical task of resupplying the service component.

The major responsibilities of both the J2 and the G2 are very similar. Both are responsible for identifying the enemy and its capabilities and intentions. Joint Publication 5-00.2 states the J2 is responsible for "the availability of sound intelligence in the characteristics of the area and on enemy locations, activities, and capabilities."[42] FM 71-100 states the G2 will focus on, "enemy formations, key terrain, and weather."[43] These two definitions are fundamentally similar, but there are some significant differences.

One major difference is the perspective the two staff agencies must take in order to be successful. The JTF is focused on the operational level. The division is focused on the tactical. At the operational level of war, the CJTF not only has to understand and disseminate tactical intelligence, he also has to understand and be kept informed of operational intelligence issues. Joint Publication 5-00.2 states that the primary purpose of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) is to "provide an operational focus, with responsibility for helping the CJTF better

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understand how the adversary thinks."[44] The JIC is focused

on providing or identifying targets that will help the CJTF

attain or meet national objectives.[45]   .

This type of analysis is quite different than that

of the tactical level of war. At the division level the G2

is focusing on predicting enemy tactical courses of action

and analyzing what the enemies' tactical objectives are for

a certain operation. Even though the military intelligence

battalion in a division has the capability in its Analysis

and Control Element (ACE) to monitor systems at corps and

echelons above corps level, it is focused on tactical

application of this information.[46]

Both staff sections are important to their

organizations and are responsible for keeping their

commanders informed about the enemy. The major difference

is that a J2 is focused at the operational level of war and

the G2 is looking at the tactical level of war. This same

type of mindset is portrayed within the J3 and the G3.

The J3 and G3 have similar types of fundamental

responsibilities. Joint Publication 0-2 states the J3,

"assists the commander in the discharge of his

responsibilities for the direction and control of

operations, beginning with planning and carrying through

until specific operations are completed."[47] This definition

applies to both the J3 and the G3. Both staff agencies are responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing forces within their units. There are also several common types of operations for which both a JTF and division will plan. Two examples of these are rear operations and deception operations. There are, however, two major differences between a J3 and a G3.

These differences are: 1) the levels of war each unit is planning for, and 2) the introduction or direct influence of U.S. governmental or non-governmental agencies at the JTF level. Like the J2, the J3 level of planning is at the operational level of war. Joint Publication 3.0 states that JTFs "are normally operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational level objectives."[48] This type of planning is quite different from the tactical level. At the tactical level the G3 is focused on "tactics employed to fight and win engagements and battles."[49]

When tasked to be a JTF, a unit will likely experience the introduction of both governmental and non-governmental elements. There is a specific task in Joint Pub 5-00.2 that requires a JTF to establish an interface with both governmental and non-governmental agencies. This task is important in both war and peacekeeping operations (the latter will be considered later in the monograph). A

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division is not used to coordinating with and may not have the capability to control these other types of elements. The J3 and G3 are similar in their fundamental processes but the different levels of war and dealing with outside agencies may make it difficult for a division to effectively assume all JTF J3 operational responsibilities.

There are two specific differences between a division staff and a JTF staff structure. The JTF includes J5 (Plans and Policy) and J6 (Communications) staff elements.[50] Currently a division staff does not have J5 and J6 counterparts as separate primary staff elements.

The J5 is responsible for future plans.[51] Joint Pub 0-2 states that the J5 "assists the commander in long range or future planning, preparation of campaign and outline plans and associated with estimates of the situation"[52] There are several other tasks for which a J5 is responsible:

(1) Long range planning and preparation for a campaign or operation.

(2) Time-phase force and deployment data (TPFDD).

(3) Civil Military Affairs (CA).[53]

(4) Ensuring politico-military activities, i.e. noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and CA are properly planned and coordinated.[54]

(5) Developing the plan for transition from war to peace to include post-conflict operations.

(6) Transferring control of the operation to civilian authorities.[55]

Joint Pub 5-00.2 states "that if a JTF does not have a J5, the J3 can perform its mission."[56] This may be true, but the JTF will not be as effective. The J3 does have a plans section that is focused on near term planning of branches and sequels for current operations. The operational link between the tactical and the strategic levels causes the J5 to look beyond current operations to a peaceful turnover of power to civilian control, i.e., post-conflict operations. For a division staff to have a J5 would likely require augmentation by elements of a combatant command or a corps headquarters.

At the division level there is a plans element within the division G3 shop. The majority of their tasks are focused at the tactical level of war with a planning focus of up to 72 hours into the future. Other tasks include:

(1) Parallel planning with the G2 and G3 to facilitate the smooth transition from future operations to current operations.

(2) Planning, integrating, coordinating, and

synchronizing future operations.

(3) Monitoring current operations to adjust future operations.[57]

A division plans for operations out to approximately 72 hours in the future;[58] a JTF J5 plans for 72 hours and beyond. The JTF needs a staff section that can plan post-conflict operations. It needs a staff section that can focus on the transition from war to peace. At the current time, a division does not have a staff element that is focused on post-conflict operations or the transition from war to peace.

The purpose of the J6, Communications, is to "assist the CJTF with his responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. This includes communications and automated systems plans to support operational and strategic concepts."[59] The key words in this definition are "operational and strategic." In order to fully support these concepts there is a need for more manpower and equipment at the division headquarters.

The current FM 71-100 does not address the need for communications support outside the tactical level of war. In order to have the capability to support the operational and strategic levels, heavy augmentation of the division is needed to form a J6.

The majority of communications support necessary to
ensure command and control (C2) throughout an operation is
encompassed in the Worldwide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCSS).[60] The WWMCSS is not only critical in the
planning and preparation phase, but throughout the execution
phase. The division signal battalion currently does not
have the capability to man or use this WWMCSS.[61] A division
J6 would have to be augmented with both personnel and
equipment in order to function effectively.[62]

In order to command and control the myriad of units
and services in a JTF, the CJTF may designate a component
command to perform the duties of an Army Forces (ARFOR)
headquarters. According to FM 71-100, the purpose of an
ARFOR headquarters is to provide support for Army units
normally supported by the service component.[63] The ARFOR
headquarters has responsibility for all Army units in the
area of operations (AOR). The senior Army headquarters
within the JTF is usually designated as the ARFOR
headquarters. FM 71-100 and lessons learned from Operation
Restore Hope show that if a division is designated as an
ARFOR headquarters it will need to be heavily augmented.[64]

The CJTF is providing himself with more flexibility
when he designates a component command as an ARFOR
headquarters. This will allow the CJTF to focus his efforts

at the operational level of war and the ARFOR commander in turn can focus on the tactical level of war. Additionally, the ARFOR simplifies command and control within a JTF. It also enables the CJTF to focus his command and control on two to four elements (the four services within DOD) rather than eight to ten different units (different divisions or brigades). Finally, it allows the subject matter experts of each service to have a stronger impact on what their specific services are executing in the operation because they are now part of the chain of command. The peculiarities of peacekeeping operations will also cause some additional augmentation in order for a division to successfully operate.

PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations are a component of Operations Other than War (OOTW). Since 1988, peace operations have almost doubled in frequency and have grown in complexity.[65] Winston Churchill stated that: "Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make good peace would never have won the war."[66] This is a paradigm that the United States needs to overcome if it is to be

successful in peace operations. Peace operations are
nothing more than another method the United States uses to
obtain its strategic objectives.

Under peace operations there are three subordinate
types of operations. They are: (1) Support to diplomacy,
(2) Peacekeeping (PK), and (3) Peace Enforcement (PE).[67]
This monograph will consider only PK and PE since these two
operations were planned for in Operation Uphold Democracy,
the case study for this analysis. According to FM 100-23,
Peace Operations, and FM 100-5, the definitions for PK and
PE are:

(1) Peacekeeping Operations: Support diplomatic
efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.
They will also stabilize conflict between two belligerents.
The PK force needs to be invited by both belligerents.
Usually the amount of force used is minimal, only self
defense. Impartiality is easily maintained during PK
operations.[68]

(2) Peace Enforcement: The application of military
force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to
international authorization, to compel compliance with
generally accepted resolution or sanctions.[69] Consent by
the belligerent is not needed. The amount of force used
depends on ROE and what force it takes to coerce or compel

the belligerents.

There are some similarities between PK and PE operations and combat operations. The differences between combat operations and PK and PE operations lie in the conditions under which the operations are being conducted. COL Dubik stated that: "The majority of my squads and platoons executed the same missions that were on their METL during Operation Uphold Democracy. They still defended a battle position or performed security operations, but the conditions were slightly different."[70] Still, there are activities that are peculiar to PK and PE operations. These peculiarities will have an impact on the force structure of a division tasked as a JTF. Two of these peculiarities involve Civil Affairs/NGO and private voluntary organizations (PVO) support, and post- conflict operations.

Civil affairs becomes an important area during any type of PK or PE operation. Many governmental and non-governmental agencies will want to get involved with providing humanitarian assistance during ongoing peace operations. This inherently forces the CJTF to coordinate with these agencies, to include UN organizations. There may be over fifty such organizations involved in one mission. The difficulty is that not all of these different agencies have to or may want to coordinate with the lead agency on

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the ground. In fact, sometimes the military may supporting

these agencies. If the military is the lead agency, the

CJTF has to be able to get both the military and these

myriad agencies working toward a common endstate.

A Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) may be the

central focus of all operations during PK and PE operations.

COL Dubik stated that "his brigade CMOC was the focus of all

operations within his brigade during Operation Uphold

Democracy."[71] The reason for this was that he had to

develop some way to coordinate all of the help he was

receiving from outside agencies. FM 100-23 states that the

purpose of a CMOC is "to account for and provide coherence

to the activities of all elements in the area".[72] Having a

CMOC is imperative in order for the JTF to have good

civilian/military relationships. This lesson was learned

the hard way in UNOSOM II in Somalia.

JTF-Somalia initially did not have a dedicated civil

affairs staff officer to assist in developing plans for

civil-military operations. The lessons learned report from

the Center of Army Lessons Learned states that: "A civil

affairs capability should be in the operational

headquarters, especially during peace operations."[73]

Currently a division headquarters has a small G5 shop

that is responsible for civil affairs. If a CMOC is formed,

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a division will need a substantial amount of augmentation in order for its G5 section to function in this critical role. This augmentation includes both manpower and equipment. Communications equipment is critical for coordination with all of the different agencies. A division will not be able to run a CMOC with its current force structure.

A second point peculiar to both PK and PE operations and conventional combat operations are post-conflict operations. Once the military has achieved its desired endstate, it has to have a plan to turn over the operation to civilian or UN control. This has to be planned for in detail in order for a smooth transition. Just reaching the military endstate is not enough. Eventually, civilian authorities need to assume control.

Ideally, a separate entity within the JTF staff has responsibility for this type of planning. It cannot be the current operations staff section as they are trying to achieve the desired military endstate. This transition from the military to civilian control should be executed just like a relief in place. The one difference is that coordination has to be made not only with military forces but local governments as well. The J5 staff section has the responsibility for planning for these operations.

Complications arise when a division is asked to dual

function as both a JTF and an ARFOR headquarters during peacekeeping operations. The facts already presented in this monograph show that a division cannot dual function as both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters with out augmentation. A division force structure is not robust enough to perform the JTF headquarters mission. A division staff is normally focused on the tactical level of war; a JTF staff is focused on the operational level of war. Expertise from the other three services of DOD are not present except for Air Force representation on a division staff. Planning 72 hours and beyond is not the focus of a division staff. Communication with the other services and the National Command Authority (NCA) will require significant manpower and equipment augmentation. Peacekeeping operations require even more augmentation to form a CMOC and to have a fully functioning J5 staff section. Finally, if it takes this much augmentation to become a JTF it will take even more to dual function as both a JTF and an ARFOR headquarters. It appears that a division cannot dual function as both a JTF/ARFOR headquarters during peacekeeping operations without considerable augmentation. Analyzing Operation Uphold Democracy will provide interesting incites on whether a division can realistically be expected to accomplish such a mission or not.

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Following the successful negotiations of Jimmy Carter (former President of the United States from 1976-1980), the 18th Airborne Corps (JTF 190) led by the 10th Mountain Division (JTF 180) commenced permissive entry into the country of Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy). The initial strategic aims for this operation were to: (1) ensure the compliance of the Carter-Cedras accords, (2) protect US citizens and their interests, (3) restore civil order, and (4) assist in the transition to a democratic government.[74] The mission was completed on 15 October 94 when President Jean Bertrand Aristide returned to take his place as president of Haiti.

The planning for this operation started back in January 1994. The 18th Abn Corps was designated as JTF 180 and commenced planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. The planning shifted to a permissive entry focus once JTF 180 completed the plan for a hostile entry. United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) wanted a separate headquarters to plan the permissive entry operation. The 10th Mountain Division was designated as JTF 190 and started planning on 29 July 1994. USACOM wanted the flexibility to wait until

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the last possible moment on whether to conduct a hostile or permissive entry. JTF 190 gave USACOM this flexibility.[75]

10th Mountain Division had to develop a plan on how to build a functional JTF headquarters. The division coordinated continuously with USACOM since there was no plan on how to build a JTF. Tenth Mountain Division initially conducted a detailed mission analysis in order to identify what augmentation would be needed for the JTF. This information was reviewed by both USACOM and Operations Group Delta, the joint component of the US Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Figure 4 highlights service percentages on the JTF staff.[76] One after action report (AAR) comment from the 10th Mountain AAR (DRAFT) stated that "while the core of the headquarters came from the division staff, the joint staff could not have been formed without the excellent augmentees from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard."[77]

Command and control throughout Operation Uphold Democracy was properly planned and executed. Initially 18th Abn Corps, commanded by LTG Shelton, was designated JTF 180. JTF 180 had the responsibility for the entire Joint Operations Area (JOA). Once JTF 190 landed in Haiti, they were subordinate to JTF 180 but responsible for all land forces. Five weeks after JTF 190 occupied Haiti, JTF 180

Operation Uphold Democracy

CJTF 190 Headquarters Staff

SERVICE	PERS #s	% OF HQS STAFF
Army	336	65%
Navy	42	8%
Marine Corps	45	9%
Air Force	73	14%
Coast Guard	6	1%
DOD Civilian	16	3%

Figure #4 JTF 190 Service Percentages

returned to Fort Bragg and JTF 190 reported directly to USACOM as the joint commander of Operation Uphold Democracy.[78]

According to FM 100-5, there are certain tasks that should be accomplished when conducting joint operations. These tasks are: (1) anticipation of future events, (2) maintain total mission awareness, and (3) build teamwork within the unit.[79] These three considerations combined with the type of augmentation which was needed will be used to measure the success of the 10th Mountain Division as a JTF.

The first question that will be reviewed is: "Was the headquarters staff capable of conducting future operations while it was functioning as a JTF/ARFOR headquarters?" The ultimate answer to this question is yes, the division could perform future planning. According to LTC Sperl (who was attached and worked for both the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy), the 10th Mountain division was eventually capable of conducting future operations when the J5 was manned and functioning.[80] There were some frustrating moments initially until the J5 fully understood the way the division conducted staff planning.[81]

The entire J5 section was built around augmentees,

since a division staff does not have a J5 staff section. A promotable lieutenant colonel, who was the FORSCOM LNO, was tasked by the commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division to be the J5.[82] Initially the entire J5 section was an ad hoc organization without any soldiers who were originally part of the 10th Mountain Division staff. Future planning initially suffered because the J5 did not use members familiar with the division staff.[83] However, after the newly formed JTF staff developed uniformed standing operating procedures (SOPs), the J5 could do his mission and plan beyond 72 hours.[84]

According to LTC Sperl, the J5 section was primarily focused on the transition of the operation to the United Nations.[85] This is an essential responsibility of a JTF J5. The J3 will focus on current operations and branches and sequels up to 72 hours into the future, the J5 on operations greater than 72 hours in the future, to include transition operations.

The second question addresses whether the 10th Mountain Division was capable of having total mission awareness during Operation Uphold Democracy. According to FM 100-5, total mission awareness is the capability of seeing the "big picture."[86] The task of seeing both the tactics within the operation and understanding the

operational and strategic aspects of the operation is
difficult, but the commander of the 10th Mountain Division
made early decisions that helped him maintain total mission
awareness.

His first decision was to designate DIVARTY
headquarters as Task Force (TF) Mountain. According to an
interview with COL Valenzuela, the DIVARTY headquarters
[commanded by the assistant division commander for
operations (ADC-O)], was the ARFOR headquarters for JTF
190.[87] At D+10 the JTF 190 commander decided to dual
function as both the JTF commander and the ARFOR commander
because the majority of the units within the JTF were Army
units.[88] Once this happened Task Force Mountain lost its
status as ARFOR headquarters and became the division's third
maneuver brigade, responsible for coalition forces.[89] This
third maneuver brigade had the responsibility for Port-au-
Prince operations, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and
coalition support, as the 1st brigade combat team (BCT) to
the ADC-O. It also had responsibility for liaison work with
the coalition forces who were working in Haiti. By doctrine
the DIVARTY is the division's alternate TOC; it therefore
had the C2 structure to support the operations of TF
Mountain. The JTF 190 commander could focus his efforts at
the operational and strategic levels because of the use of

TF Mountain.[90]

The second decision that ensured total mission awareness was the establishment of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Traditionally, Civil Affairs (CA) units are trained to work with civilian leaders at the local level.[91] However, during this operation the CA units had to work with NGO's, PVO's, international agencies, and agencies of the US Government.[92] The majority of these agencies did not have to work or coordinate with military units participating in the operation but, the establishment of the CMOC was a successful means of coordinating all of these different organizations to work in the cooperation with service elements and each other during operations.

LTC Sperl stated: "A lot of these different organizations feel uncomfortable working with the military and the sight of fire arms."[93] The 10th Mountain Division formed two different CMOCs (split section) to defeat this problem.[94] One CMOC was located at the American consulate in Port-au-Prince. The other CMOC was located within the division TOC.[95] This provided the different organizations the capability to work with whichever CMOC they felt comfortable.

The establishment of a CMOC gave the 10th Mountain Division commander more flexibility to conduct both military

operations and civil operations. In order to facilitate the
operations of the CMOC, all units needed to train on the
capabilities of international agencies in addition to the
capabilities of the local agencies prior to deployment.[96]

The third question is whether the 10th Mountain
Division staff was able to exercise teamwork while
performing its mission. Initially JTF 190 had problems
working as a team, but as time went on the organization
began to form and work more efficiently together.

The reason the staff initially had problems was that
it was ad hoc, made up of different service elements that
had not worked together routinely. Even though the JTF was
founded on a division base structure, there were still
augmentation personnel who did not understand how the
division functioned or how a JTF should work.[97] In early
August 1994, joint planners from USACOM and other
headquarters came to Fort Drum to provide support to the
10th Mountain during the planning process. However, a
problem was the lack of control by JTF 190 over the support
personnel on a day-to-day basis. Tenth Mountain did not
have control of the joint planners from USACOM; as a result
they came and went as they pleased.[98]

What did help establish teamwork was the USACOM J7
(Training Programs/JTF Procedures) and Team Delta of the

BCTP program.   These two agencies provided training to the
ad hoc division staff on how to transition to a JTF staff.[99]
BCTP Team Delta also provided constructive comments to the
10th Mountain Division during the planning process.[100]   Both
Team Delta and the J7 had expertise in joint planning and
thoroughly analyzed both JTF 190's initial draft OPLAN and
USACOM's initial OPLAN to ensure the former met its higher
headquarters requirements.[101]   JTF 190 incorporated the
suggestions of Team Delta and J7 into the final OPLAN
published on 16 August 1994.[102]

Initially the teamwork suffered, but, as LTC Sperl
put it, "it got a lot better with time."[103]   Additionally,
there is now a Joint Planning Mission Training Plan (MTP)
that will help a newly formed JTF staff understand what
tasks will be needed in order to be an effective JTF.   These
MTPs should be a manual issued to every division
headquarters.

The final question is: "Was augmentation needed in
order for the division to be successful?"   The answer to
this question is a definite yes.   Augmentation was needed in
many areas.   Throughout the doctrinal and case study
research there were four specific areas that needed
significant augmentation in order for the division to be
successful.   These four areas were the J2, J5, J6, and the

CMOC.

According to LTC Sperl, the 10th Mountain's G2 shop could not function as a J2 because of equipment and personnel shortages.[104] An AAR comment from the Center of Army Lessons Learned states that: "A Light division lacks the required intelligence systems architecture to efficiently support a JTF headquarters."[105] In short, the Mission Training Plan (MTP) from USACOM says that a fully functional J2 shop needs 150 personnel in order to run. Due to movement restrictions placed on JTF 190, 83 soldiers was the number that could be deployed for the J2. Of that 83 soldiers, 48 came from the 10th Mountain Division.[106] According to AAR comments from both CALL and LTC Sperl, the J2 in JTF 190 was ineffective until JTF 180 left country and the 519th MI Bn from the corps MI brigade augmented JTF 190.[107]

The lesson learned here is that there needs to be an intelligence package developed that can be attached to the division G2 so it can perform its function as a J2. JTF 190 was lucky that JTF 180 was present early in the deployment to facilitate the performance of the JTF 190 J2 operations.

The J5 shop was a completely ad hoc staff built entirely around augmetees. The numbers needed for the J5 to run effectively were developed after JTF 190 conducted its

initial mission analysis and coordinated with USACOM. Initially it was supposed to be six LTCs and 14 majors.[109] There was also supposed to be a mix of branches and services in order to get the broad spectrum of experience needed to handle the planning of turning over the mission to the United Nations.[109]

JTF 190 did not get either the numbers or experience needed to execute the mission efficiently. An additional problem was that there was no one on the J5 shop that was originally part of the 10th Mountain Division.[110] This caused some frustration within the staff because trying to learn JTF operations combined with learning how a different headquarters conducts daily business causes a significant problem. Once again, there needs to be a J5 augmentation module from the combatant command that augments a newly formed JTF quickly. More importantly, some soldiers from the division base structure need to work with the J5 in order to facilitate optimal performance.

Previous research has shown that a division does not have the capability to create a J6. An AAR comment from CAL states that: "The division JTF J6 and JCCC must receive extensive communicational augmentation from external sources."[111] JTF 190 received its augmentation support from the 11th Signal Brigade of the Army's Information Systems

Command. It also received some augmentation from the Air Force and the Marine Corps.[112] LTC Sperl stated that "the J6 was not fully functional until it received augmentation from the 36th Signal Bde of the XVIII Airborne Corps."[113]

Two other considerations regarding the J6 were recognized by the 10th Mountain Division. The first was that the 10th Mountain Division lacked expertise in echelons above corps (EAC) communications planning, strategic communications, and satellite communications.[114] The second point was that there was a lack of WMMCS system trained personnel.[115] Once again, there needs to be set packages at the combatant command level for communications support to a JTF. A division needs to train with it routinely and know exactly with what it will be augmented when asked to be a JTF headquarters.

Finally, there needs to be a discussion of the CMOC augmentation. The 10th Mountain Division does have a G5, (Civil Affairs) staff section. It is not very robust. The augmentation needed will routinely come from the reserve component. However, the active component (AC) and the reserve component (RC) need to understand how Civil Affairs doctrine is executed.

Doctrinally, the active component initially assesses the situation and coordinates with the reserve component,

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who will execute the mission.[116] During Operation Uphold
Democracy, the active component CA and the reserve component
CA arrived in Haiti simultaneously. This caused a
significant amount of friction between both units regarding
who would run the CMOC.[117]

In summary, a division can perform its mission as
both a JTF and ARFOR headquarters given significant
augmentation. However, there are certain conditions that
need to be met to further enhance its performance. These
conditions will be presented in the following chapter.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph has demonstrated that a division can
not dual function as a JTF and an ARFOR headquarters.
However, if a division is set up for success by its higher
headquarters it can successfully dual function as a
JTF/ARFOR headquarters. There are several conditions that
need to be present in order to facilitate the success of a
division. These conditions are: (1) heavy augmentation
from higher headquarters or a combatant command, (2) a
majority of the components of a JTF are made up by the Army

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as was the case during Operation Uphold Democracy, and (3) a well focused, limited mission such as was evident in Operation Uphold Democracy when JTF 180 delegated the permissive entry option to JTF 190.

This monograph has previously provided information on some areas in which the 10th Mountain Division received augmented. In order for a division staff to be successful as a JTF/ARFOR headquarters it will need to be augmented in a similar manner. A modular block augmentation system should be used when augmenting a division. For example, either at the corps level or combatant command level, there should be a modular block of resources that can work within the division staff. The modular block will provide the JTF capabilities needed for the division headquarters to successfully function as a JTF. These modular blocks should train and work together as a cohesive section so when they are placed within the division, the initial confusion of a newly formed ad hoc JTF will be minimal. The JTF will still be an ad hoc organization, but the modular blocks will not be ad hoc in nature. In addition to the modular block concept, the division staff sections should know their modular counterparts and how they will fit into the division/JTF staff.

A JTF should dual function as both a JTF and an

ARFOR headquarters when the majority of the JTF is composed
of elements of the Army. The major reason why a division
should dual function is the lack of resources it has to
create two separate JTF and ARFOR headquarters. One
advantage of dual functioning is that the division commander
will utilize his entire staff rather than splitting it up to
form two completely different staffs. This enables the JTF
commander to utilize his first team in total. This will
also facilitate the transformation from a division to a JTF
staff because the commander will be using his first string.
The 10th Mountain Division made this decision at D+10,
during Operation Uphold Democracy, for the same reasons.[118]

Finally, a division will be more successful as a JTF
and ARFOR headquarters the more its mission is focused.
During Operation Uphold Democracy, JTF 190 was given the
mission to conduct a permissive entry into Haiti.[119] This
was a well-focused mission that a division could plan for.
A division would have had difficulty planning for both the
hostile entry and the permissive entry like the XVIII
Airborne Corps was planning for. XVIII Airborne Corps
formed JTF 190 around the 10th Mountain Division and gave
them a focused mission with the support required to perform
the mission in Haiti. XVIII Airborne Corps also stayed in
Haiti for several weeks until the 10th Mountain Division had

control of the mission in Haiti. In addition, a lot of support that was in place to support JTF 180 stayed in place to support JTF 190. The combination of a well-focused mission and continual support enabled JTF 190 to function as a JTF and ARFOR headquarters.

There are several recommendations that will further enable a division to function as both a division in a normal capacity and as a JTF/ARFOR headquarters. There should not be any base division force structure changes just because of the increased utilization of JTFs in recent years. With the reduction in resources, the Army can not afford to make the same mistake it made with the Pentomic Division in the late 1950's. A United States Army division should be able to perform both missions as a tactical division and as a JTF/ARFOR. Some recommendations are:

(1) Officer education: Officers at the Command and General Staff College should be given increased instruction on joint operations, specifically JTFs. An elective in the second and third term could focus on the formulation of a JTF based on a corps or division headquarters.

(2) Modularity system of augmentation: Augmentation should not be completely ad hoc. Specific modules should be built and trained at the corps and

combatant command level to augment a division. This will decrease the friction inherent in a completely ad hoc organization.

(3) Flow of information: Information flow within a division is extremely complex because of the increased number of information collection capabilities. Information flow will become even more complex when a division becomes a JTF. Early identification of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) is essential. Once the commander identifies his CCIR, they need to be tracked and the information concerning the CCIR should be presented to the commander for a decision. Additionally, they should be updated and refined continuously throughout the operation.

(4) BCTP at the joint level: According to a trip report provided by LTC Sperl, USACOM is developing a three phase program to train potential JTF headquarters on joint operations.[120] This program is currently set up for corps level or three star commands. If a division is going to be tasked to be a JTF, it should participate in these exercises also.

(5) Written doctrine: Doctrine needs to be written within FM 71-100 to address the formulation of a division as a JTF headquarters. Joint Publication 5.00-2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures discusses

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how to form a JTF, but there are peculiarities that effect a division when it is asked to be a JTF.

A division headquarters is capable of dual functioning as a JTF and ARFOR headquarters when it receives augmentation from a corps or a combatant command. The recommendations above will facilitate a smoother transition for units tasked to make the demanding changes essential to maximizing the probability of success.

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